The Modern Smokejumper

Today’s Smokejumper

A seasonal round’s ruminations.

These are interesting times for the USFS Smokejumper program and its employees. This piece reflects a few of my personal opinions and addresses some of the challenges and obstacles that I feel we face today. I am in no way speaking for others and I don’t necessarily share the views of anyone within the program or otherwise.

I’m not one for exact statistics, figures or percentages and I’m going to limit this piece to generalities, perspectives and conjecture. I believe that one can gain a lot of insight on an issue by simply looking at trends and by using a more heuristic and humanistic approach to an analysis.

Personal Background

I began working for the Forest Service in the summer of 2000 with the Bitterroot National Forest on the Darby Ranger District. It was a busy season and I was exposed to the myriad of components that make up wildland fire. Over the next 3 years I worked on two different Hotshot crews; Sawtooth and Bonneville. My primary role on both crews was as a sawyer. By the time I left Bonneville in ‘03 I was a fairly competent C faller and had a good understanding of fire behavior and suppression strategies. I rookied for the Missoula Smokejumpers in 2004 and have remained there until today with the exception of two 120 day details; one to the Redmond Smokejumpers and the other to West Yellowstone. At this point I have roughly 150 total jumps and just shy of 60 operational fire jumps. I’ve pursued my overhead qualifications aggressively and am currently an ICT3 trainee, Division trainee and Helibase Manager trainee. I have a handful of single resource qualifications, including ICT4, Task Force Leader and Helicopter Manager. Over the past several years I’ve averaged in the neighborhood of 40-60 days working outside of the smokejumper program on overhead assignments, helicopter details or on miscellaneous details.

During the winter I’ve complimented my fire skills by working in the ski industry. I worked for the Snowbird Ski Patrol for 6 years before moving on to Snowcat and Heli-Ski, guiding in both Utah and Nevada for another 4 years. I was employed as a lead guide, avalanche forecaster and assistant operations manager. In 2010 I took a job with the Bridger Bowl Ski Patrol in Bozeman and currently work there as a senior patroller, assistant avalanche forecaster/technician, and avalanche search dog handler. I also work intermittently with the Gallatin National Forest Avalanche Forecast Center and I volunteer for Gallatin County Search and Rescue, primarily as an avalanche search dog handler and certifier. In my free time I am a freelance photographer specializing in commercial and editorial portraiture and fashion. My degree from the University of Montana is in Financial Management with an emphasis in Investment Banking.

I give you my background simply to illustrate that I have a fairly well-rounded and somewhat unique perspective on some of the current issues we face as smokejumpers. I run a small business, I work in technical environments outside of fire, I’ve had significant medical training and experience and I’ve done a lot of risk management.

Smokejumpers

While most reading this will have a firm grasp of the modern and traditional fire environments, I think a brief overview is in order to adequately understand the challenges we face today as jumpers. Things have changed quite a bit in the last 10 years; more so since the programs inception. The “bread and butter” fires of smokejumping’s past, primarily wilderness fires and remote initial attack fires requiring 2-10 people are less common today. For these remote and isolated fires of day’s past, there were few alternatives for land managers other than using jumpers. Smokejumper bases were staffed heavily. Missoula employed close to 200 jumpers at times during the 60’s and 70’s.  It wasn’t rare for jumpers to get 20 or more operational jumps in a year. Most jumpers were employed seasonally, and the core group was primarily young, single men.  Many were students and very few stayed on for more than the operational season. Many of those only jumped for a handful of years before moving into another career.

Now, contrast that with today’s smokejumper, our current staffing levels and the broad range of missions jumpers are used for today, including all risk incident command, initial attack fire suppression, district project and fuels work, prescribed fire, fireline leadership, supervision and mentorship, teaching, training and more. Many wilderness areas across the country now employ fire-use management principles and often forest heli-tack crews tackle many of the local “remote” fires. Today many jumpers average only 6-12 operational jumps a year, and base staffing across the program is at an all time low while retention remains very high. For the first time ever the Redmond base employs fewer jumpers than the North Cascades base. Missoula currently staffs in the neighborhood of 60 jumpers. The vast majority of the national program is comprised of career appointed men and women with children. Many of those folks, if not funded for year-round work, are either actively or passively looking for year-round work. Many, if not the majority, have college degrees, many with post-grad degrees.

The Missoula program, of which I’m the most familiar, is a strong and successful program. Dozens of well-rounded recruits with multiple years of hotshot, heli-tack and engine experience apply annually for a few sought after positions. Attrition during rookie training is low, and new jumpers typically stay for years or longer after their first season. The base itself retains a modern esprit de corps, with strong work ethic, drive, humility and dedication. 

Current Fire Behavior and Initial Attack

Approximately half of the fires I’ve responded to as a jumper have been large, aggressive, emerging fires. The days of the “two-manner” are, more or less, gone. Today, we often jump fires as a crew, ordering additional jumpers from surrounding bases to support the effort if needed. I won’t get into forest management or beetle kill or fuel densities on our National Forests; it suffices to say that today’s fires require early detection, early prioritization of both fires and responding resources, and man-power for an initial attack to be successful. 

An enormous change and challenge is the amount of urban interface in our forests today. Values at risk have escalated significantly. Managers will wait longer to dispatch limited resources to small remote fires when the possibility exists that an undetected fire will show itself later in the burn period, potentially threatening a community. Due to this simple fact, fires are not always attacked as quickly as they could be. Prioritization of resources and fires becomes a complicated dance resulting in delayed dispatches for initial attack resources. The result being that fires become more established before we arrive.

Now that I’ve given some background regarding how the fire environment has changed and how our roles as jumpers have changed, we can take a critical look at our program. Are we adequately assessing our capabilities to handle these new challenges? If not, how can we adapt to that always-changing end-goal? Does our program meet the needs of today’s fire managers and our other users? Are we adequately diversified enough to handle the broad range of all-risk assignments for which we may be used? Are we skilled enough leaders for the roles we may be asked to fill? How can we continue to retool ourselves to meet the needs of the future?

I’m going to address three fundamental problems that I think we, as jumpers, need to address in order for our program to move successfully into the future, and ultimately to thrive in the future. These problems are an over qualified and under-compensated workforce. Understaffing and how it relates to what we not so affectionately call, “lockdown”; (resulting in decreased crew experience, lost training opportunities and a lack of relationship building with our users).  And finally the actual parachute system itself; the storied round versus ram-air (“square”) debate.

An Overqualified and Under-compensated Workforce

A primary component of the smokejumpers mission today involves a lot of incident management and leadership on fires. Often, when we jump these emerging incidents, we’re not so much “pounding line”, as we are setting up the Incident Command System (ICS); coming up with the strategies and plans to begin the process of extended attack. We staff every airplane in Missoula with a Type 3 Incident Commander. On any given plane load we also have multiple Division and Task Force qualified leaders, EMTs and paramedics, heli-tack, C-fallers, the list is long. Even first year jumpers often get tasked with Incident Command responsibilities and we all take on increasingly challenging logistical assignments, ie.. gps recons, mapping, radio operations and intelligence gathering, etc. When the ordered resources arrive, typically during the second operational period we plug them in quickly, efficiently and safely. 

The “manpower” of the jump base is at the GS 5, 6 and to some extent the 7 levels. Because this “job” has turned into a career for most people, attrition and turnover has dropped to just shy of non-existent. Jumpers are remaining at the GS 6, both temporary and seasonal, level for literally decades. If a “6” is motivated, it is not hard to have the equivalent skills and qualifications, (if not more), than some of the base leadership. Additionally, many of our 5s and 6s actually spend more time out on fires during the season. They don’t have the base supervisory responsibilities that require time at station. These “entry level” smokejumpers are filling any number of supervisory and overhead positions on large, dynamic and complex fires. We all still enjoy, in fact, love, the line digging aspect of the job; and don’t get me wrong, even our GS 8s and above still dig a lot of line every summer. All are still encouraged however, and at some level expected, to be pursuing qualifications and overhead positions on fires. The first speech a rookie receives upon completion of training reflects this attitude; the expectation being, “that you will become a leader in the national fire program.”   

At my experience level, 8 years after becoming a GS 6, I’m competing with probably close to 30+ other extremely qualified jumpers with an equal amount of experience, time-in-grade and qualifications for a seasonal GS 7 appointment in Missoula. Most have ~15 years of fire experience on engines, hotshot crews, and ~8+ years as jumpers. Most are married with kids. The current system of compensation is flawed and woefully inadequate. We need to be compensated for our skills, motivation, drive and leadership in the fire community. This summer I was supervising Task Force trainee’s that were GS 12’s making probably 3 times more than I was! Is it so unreasonable to think that if I’m managing close to 200 people on an active division with significant values at risk that I should at least be compensated as well as a Type 2 Crewboss? Compound that with the liability insurance that we’re all encouraged to carry, as our agency won’t necessarily support us legally, and it literally becomes somewhat asinine to even want to pursue those qualifications and the accompanying responsibilities. And yet all of us do it. It is expected of us.

I believe the BLM program has a slightly better system, with reward-based upgrades as people meet certain leadership criteria. In our organization, temporary 120-day upgrades based solely on qualifications being pursued/attained, seems like a start. While we give out a few every year, they should be widespread. Do they even cost the base much out of pocket during a moderate to busy fire season when the majority of our personnel’s wages are covered by fire dollars?   

To add insult to injury, many of us are not even eligible for basic jobs inside fire program leadership outside of the smokejumper program due to the simple fact that we lack time-in-grade at the GS 7 level. 

Staffing Levels and “Lockdown”

Many forest managers still aren’t using smokejumpers to our full potential. Some Fire Management Officers still think that our core mission is to put out small, remote wilderness fires. Some fail to realize that we are very experienced “teams” that may be a solution to a multitude of fire and all risk problems. Some fail to realize the extent of our individual supervisory capabilities and qualifications. Most districts are facing significant financial constraints, resulting in slashed equipment budgets and personnel staffing.  This is widespread throughout the country and on almost every National Forest. These districts may have had 5 engines and an IA crew several years ago, but today are severely “hamstrung”, with minimal personnel to support only a few engines. Smokejumpers could easily fill some of these shortages on a call-when-needed basis. 

So why are some managers failing to realize what an asset the smokejumper program could be for them? Simply put, we fail to build strong relationships with our users. Furthermore, we fail to educate them on our revised mission and our current capabilities. 

When we actually initial attack small fires we are extremely self-sufficient. It is both our strength and our weakness.  Managers order us because they have limited resources on hand, they know we will solve their problem efficiently and cost effectively, and they know we require minimal logistical support. We leave almost as silently as we drop in; typically submitting a fireman’s report with a handshake for a job well done. One could contrast that to an extended attack overhead assignment, where a jumper works hand-in-hand with dozens of fire managers from around the country. A smokejumper has the opportunity to form exponentially more relationships with managers than one would be able to make on initial attack fires during the same time period; all in an operational and environmental context. As overhead we get to “prove” ourselves, and be mentored and mentor others, both personally and professionally on these assignments.

There is no reason for not pursuing these overhead opportunities at all cost! These relationships are instrumental for growing Smokejumper program support and are key to increased smokejumper use as we move into the future. The added value is that our jumpers, which are now getting tasked with taking on more responsibilities on these larger initial attack fires, get hands-on experience on well-organized fires from experienced trainers. In my experience, the only way to become a smart, confident, respected leader is to practice those skills and continually expose oneself to the ICS environment. If we are getting used less as traditional smokejumpers we need to diversify as firefighters.

“Lockdown.” Overqualified and underpaid GS 6’s literally cringe when we hear the word. Quite simply, it means that the local or regional coordination center has deemed smokejumpers more valuable than overhead, and has closed the door to all training and supervisory opportunities. Lockdown eliminates a dozen or more significant training and relationship building opportunities annually for our team alone. The coordination center wants smokejumpers staffing aircraft, and I whole-heartedly agree with this. Why would you have 26 seats on aircraft sitting on the ramp with only 20 jumpers available to fill those seats? The simple solution is to hire more GS5/GS6 temporary and permanent seasonal jumpers and request boosts more frequently and earlier. When national coordination centers come to the realization that there is a national shortage of smokejumpers, we will get the Washington Office’s attention.  We need our numbers back to where they were historically if we want to be used in every capacity and to our full capability.

Personally, I want to spend as much time as possible on fire during the season in a diverse range of positions. The only way I can close the financial gap between my “realized” value and my income, (due to being overqualified and undercompensated), is to be on fires during the fire season. The more time I spend on fire, the more money I make. The more experience I gain, the more qualifications I can pursue, the more competence I will have as a leader on fires and at the base, and the more relationships I will form that will benefit the base in both the short and long-term. You can’t limit ambitious people on the team that strive to branch out, both personally and professionally as smokejumpers, without having a direct negative impact on the greater program. We need this job to be flexible enough to provide us the opportunity to do both.

There are always jumpers that request to be available locally, or have family obligations, or simply don’t want to pursue project fires and details and would rather “jump” fires. Increasing the number of entry-level smokejumpers would support this core initial attack force, while allowing more senior members to pursue qualifications while building relationships with users outside of smokejumping. 

I am passionate about smokejumping! I love jumping fires! But I think it is critical that we don’t lose sight of the fact that the reality is pretty clear; only a percentage of our year is spent jumping fires and we need to diversify and network as much as possible within the national fire program if we want to strengthen our own. 

Parachute Systems

This brings me to my last point, the square versus round debate, and the Forest Service’s possible transition to the ram-air parachute. At this point I have personally chosen to remain on the round system.

The ram-air parachute is expensive. Management has said that the transition to the square parachute would cost the program approximately $12 million over 10 years. Currently the Redmond base is as small as they’ve ever been. The rumors abound that Redmond and NCSB are both facing serious budget constraints, that Missoula may absorb West Yellowstone in the future, and that Redding has a retention problem.  Missoula is ~20 people fewer than when I started. Every district in the country is slashing jobs and equipment. Even our own Regional Office is talking about moving employees from their downtown office to the Aerial Fire Depot to free up lease dollars.  How, in light of this economic downturn and governmental shift towards “cost savings” and budget cuts, can we realistically be arguing for such an expensive system? Is it not fiscal irresponsibility?

Also, where is the guarantee of this $12 million in financial support? Is this support still going to be available 5 years into this transition if the Forest Service continues to slash budgets, personnel and equipment nationwide? If our funding stops, which is fairly plausible, or if our estimated cost of implementation is inaccurate or insufficient, what are the chances that we’ll be able to move forward on a system that is estimated to be 2-3 times more expensive than our current one? Along those lines, what are the costs to the end-user after successful implementation of the ram-air system? One of the strongest criticisms of the smokejumper program from our users is our high cost. Are these users interested in absorbing the additional costs of the ram-air system when they see no added value from it? They ultimately don’t care how we get there; they care about a particular problem we solve for them. This pot of money addresses the transition to the system, but doesn’t adequately address the expenses after implementation or address how districts will be saddled with the burden after the fact.

Almost everyone I’ve talked to flying a ram-air parachute thinks that improvements need to be made to the current 3 evaluation canopies. Why would you adopt, pay for and transition to a system when it is not a finished product? Do people fail to realize that we have the ultimate freedom and latitude right now to explore these problems, their solutions and alternatives? We have the ability to test new systems, new canopies, new products, different manufacturers and developers. When we adopt a system, won’t we be transitioning to “The System”? A system that it seems like, we’re increasingly not all that excited about. It will be infinitely harder to correct or change systems down the road if we make a commitment to something that doesn’t currently meet our needs. 

The training and loft requirements are significantly higher. The majority of the square jumpers that I’ve talked to have expressed the need for more training jumps relative to a round to remain as proficient. This is to be expected; it is a much more technical parachute system. The learning curve for flying the ram-air is steeper and some of our most experienced jumpers experience significant challenges during both training and on operational fire jumps.  In addition, numerous high and low speed malfunctions requiring reserve deployments require additional training. Since Missoula began evaluating the ram-air we’ve watched the man-hours dedicated to the loft and training skyrocket. Between ram-air refresher, new man ram-air training, train-the-trainer courses, harness manufacturing, commitments to Alaska and Boise for continued training after certification and continued testing and evaluation of the 3 different canopies, the time commitment is significant. As we move forward with the transition, Missoula’s employees will be traveling to, and training other jumpers around the country. As it is there are only a limited number of people available for district (local project) work outside of the base and that number will decrease for the foreseeable future. Isn’t our real mission fire suppression, prescribed fire, fuels projects, hazardous fuel reduction, duty officer assignments, tree climbing, team assignments, etc? This is an enormous opportunity cost that few seem to acknowledge. Our users, (and the Forest Service), needs smokejumpers and leaders in the field, not in the loft and under canopy.

Another negative impact of the transition is the possible elimination of the detailer program. Missoula typically trains several temporary detailers from around the country annually. These individuals are critical to the success of the program and have proven to be very valuable proponents and users of smokejumpers time and time again. They learn about the capabilities of the smokejumper program and then return to their home units armed with that knowledge and their relationships formed during the detail. Will this program continue to exist if we transition to the ram-air?

I have yet to be presented with a solid list of advantages that the ram-air canopy has over the round; the exceptions being the RSL (reserve static line deployment) and the AAD (automatic activation device) systems used with the square. Could these systems not be integrated into a round canopy at a relative cost? Why are we still using the antiquated Capewell system on the round instead of a three-ring release system? Can we not integrate the RSL system into our existing reserve/main? Why can’t we use an AAD on a round?

Yes the square can handle higher winds. In ~60 operational fire jumps I’ve been winded out 2 times, and I’ve landed moving backwards maybe a few more. More typically it seems that if rounds don’t jump, squares don’t jump either. If they do jump, we reinforce them the next morning when conditions are more favorable. I’ve been on several fires where rounds have jumped and the squares didn’t due to the limitations of the cloud ceiling. They typically came back later in the day or the next morning to support us. This argument seems like a moot point?

Mid-air collisions on Forest Service round canopies are extremely rare. While they have happened, several with severe consequences, these mid-air collisions have typically been the result of pilot error and a lack of situational awareness, not equipment failure or parachute malfunction. While one can gain more vertical separation when using a square parachute, which would theoretically minimize the risk of a “mid-air”, jumpers are humans and will make mistakes. I have seen several square jumpers do one too many bomb turns in the name of vertical separation, ultimately resulting in an altitude insufficient to make the jump spot. A mid-air collision on a ram-air has a high probability of disastrous consequences, severe injury and possible death for both jumpers involved. Mid-airs on a round canopy are fairly common in military mass-exit troop deployment, and are statistically proven to only rarely result in a collapsed canopy, a fatality or even an injury. Forest Service round jumpers typically jump two at a time and horizontal separation and airspace issues should be a non-factor for a well trained jumper. If a particular jump spot is so small that air space will be an issue then we should be jumping single person sticks regardless of the canopy.

Malfunction rates on a round compared to a square are simply incomparable. The malfunctions that do occur on a round are almost exclusively slow speed in nature and do not require a reserve deployment. The most common malfunction, and a rare one at that, is a broken steering line resulting in a slow turn in one direction. Jumpers are taught to utilize “riser turns” to counteract this slow turn. It is typical to do at least one practice jump per season using only the risers to steer.  This provides a controlled training simulation for this particular malfunction. Steering line malfunctions on ram-air parachutes induce a fast and uncontrollable spin requiring an unstable reserve deployment. Ram-air parachutes are susceptible to a wider range and a greater number of malfunctions.  The vast majority of those malfunctions require reserve deployment. That’s simply not an acceptable level of risk for me. 

Many of our jump spots on forests throughout the country involve penetrating a fairly tight canopy. It is significantly more challenging to sink a square parachute vertically. The ram-air parachute requires forward air speed to fly with stability; as you decrease forward air speed, you decrease stability, increasing risk as the potential of stalling the canopy rises.  As ram-air canopies stall, they begin falling backwards and the only course of action is to increase forward air speed, often resulting in surging, abrupt and swift forward acceleration.  This typically occurs at very low elevations and on the final descent.  The consequences can be severe and unforgiving.

One can have softer landings on the ram-air canopy if the canopy is flared well in favorable winds. Complaints of hard landings on the round canopy are common with our larger jumpers. Our current large round canopy was designed with a specified weight limit.  If we are meeting or exceeding these specifications, we need to manufacture an extra large canopy. The alternative to a soft ram-air landing can be much worse than a hard round landing however, and often results in significant physical injury, a higher potential for paralysis and the possibility of death in extreme cases. Simple physics can easily explain the concept that seems lost on so many.

Kinetic energy is the measurement of energy in motion. Mechanism of Injury, and the associated blunt force trauma, is directly correlated to the kinetic energy experienced during an accident. The key component here is velocity; it’s important because as speed increases it is squared!

KE=1/2 *m*v² where m is mass and v is velocity.

Lets look at a 150 lb male. One jumper is on the square system and one on the round system. The wind is 10 mph. 

The square has an approximate forward speed of 20mph, subtract the 10 and he is traveling 10mph. If he’s a good pilot he should easily be able to flare his chute on landing and have an easy, soft, slow speed landing.

The round moving at 10mph forward speed is now traveling at 0mph. While he can’t flare, he has no forward speed.  If he executes a good roll, the landing will be similarly straightforward with slightly more vertical fall. The potential kinetic energy in both of these landings is close with a slight edge to the round from a numbers perspective; the edge going to the square if the pilot flares perfectly, due to decreased vertical fall involved. The kinetic energy in each landing is low, probably between 0 and 30.

Now lets look at the same two jumpers. This time they both get caught off guard with a 180 degree, 10 mph wind switch at their backs.

The round is running with a tailwind, moving 20mph, with velocity squared of 400 and with kinetic energy of 300. He’s in for a hard landing, and the risk for injury is fairly high.

The ram-air pilot loses his ability to flare due to his speed relative to the wind speed and he’s now moving close to 30 mph. His velocity squared is 900 compared to 400 on the round!  His kinetic energy in turn is 675 versus 300 for the round! The ram-air’s probability of injury is significantly higher than that of the round because his kinetic energy is greater than 2 times that of the round in this example! 

Emts, paramedics and doctors around the world rely on a “complete and accurate account of the mechanism of injury” to predict injuries and treat trauma patients. It should be obvious that there is a high probability for significant blunt force traumatic injury to a jumper when he experiences a hard, high velocity landing on a ram-air parachute. We’ve all witnessed this phenomenon, and we’ve all seen even experienced square parachute pilots suffer high velocity landings. I believe that our ram-air injury rates over the previous 5 years attest to this. There is no denying that smokejumping is a somewhat dangerous mode of travel. There are inherent risks when parachuting into unforgiving, harsh, rocky terrain commonly accompanied by variable mountain winds. These risks increase significantly when jumping a ram-air parachute.

I shouldn’t even have to mention the 3 fatalities, Billy Martin, David Liston and most recently Mark Urban, which have occurred on the ram-air system since 1990.  The Bureau of Land Management smokejumper program currently employees around 150 jumpers. Since 1990 their program has experienced, on average, a fatality every 8 years. The USFS program employs approximately 300 jumpers.  From past experience, does it seem reasonable that the Smokejumper program as a whole, might experience 2 fatalities every 8 years if the Forest Service transitions to the ram-air?  What would happen to our program if we adopt this parachute and 4 years from now had a fatality, paralysis or severely debilitating injury to one of our jumpers? Can the program survive an incident like this? Can we accept that as a cost of doing business? I can’t envision a transition back to the round after a serious incident, years into funding, with a program wide commitment to a new parachute. This doesn’t even account for the more hazardous, technical jump country found in Regions 1, 5 and 6 versus the BLM’s jump country. If we are willing to accept these increased risks, what are the real, actual, tangible advantages of the ram-air system? I want to see concrete evidence and explicit explanations for why this canopy is better than the one we’re currently on.

Ultimately, as I write this, I realize that little of why I am so passionate about the smokejumper program has anything to do with the parachute or parachuting. While I do parachute 15 to 20 times a year, I don’t necessarily consider myself an expert parachutist. Professional parachutists parachute for a living, they jump multiple times every day; many make thousands of jumps annually. Some accrue tens of thousands of jumps during their career. They are the best canopy pilots in the world and they pursue new technologies and innovation as an industry.  We are simply firefighters that parachute. Does the USDA and the Forest Service really want to delve into parachute development, design and testing for such a niche group of users, which are increasingly getting used less and less by districts around the country? Are we willing to sacrifice professional development to become more focused parachutists?

Closing

I’ve loved living the life of a smokejumper. The people, the places, the experiences, the opportunities, the adventure; the skills, the training, the challenges, the obstacles, the fears and the insight that I’ve gained while employed as a smokejumper have given me an acute appreciation of what one is truly capable of if one puts their mind to it. I typically spend less than 20 minutes a year under canopy, but spend close to 6 months of my life away from home, dedicated to fire and the travel and the lifestyle associated with it. During that 6-month period I spend close to 100 days on active fire assignments and work nearly 800 hours of overtime, filling a variety of roles while making significant sacrifices to other aspects of my personal and professional life. I enjoy the small initial attack fires with close friends, but I also grow from the challenges, personal tests and complexities found in incident command and on large project fires. I want to see this program move healthily forward into the future while providing it’s employees with the career opportunities and support that they deserve. The Smokejumper program is, at its core, the strongest Professional Development Program in the Forest Service, and in my opinion, one of the strongest in the country outside of the military. Individuals that leave the Smokejumper program go on to become extremely strong leaders, mentors and role models throughout this country.  They pursue a wide range of careers from national incident managers and fire leaders to politicians to scientists to private business owners and entrepreneurs.  I think it’s critical that we don’t lose sight of what this program really means to most of us; while truly recognizing how fragile it may really be.

Jon Marshall

MSO ‘04